A small number of ride-hailing drivers can instantly grab long-distance high-fare orders, and massive abnormal operation logs in platform backends exposed the fraud. A programmer developed an automated order-grabbing cheating program, bundled it with activation keys for sale, and multi-level agents resold them with markup across numerous provinces nationwide, with thousands of activation keys activated cumulatively. Two ride-hailing drivers purchased the cheating program and set up offline studios offering order-grabbing proxy services. Police traced electronic evidence and capital flows to dig deep into the criminal ring, arresting all seven suspects.
Why do high-priced intercity orders get snatched in an instant by a handful of drivers, whose order acceptance efficiency far outpaces that of regular counterparts? Based on abnormal backend data from ride-hailing platforms, police busted a well-organized criminal chain of ride-hailing order-grabbing cheating programs spanning multiple provinces, and seven defendants have faced legal sanctions.
Massive Abnormal Operations Draw Police Attention
Mr. Wang, a ride-hailing driver with two years of experience, has always complied with platform rules and accepted orders manually. Yet recently, he clearly sensed unfair competition: premium long-distance rides to airports and cross-city trips vanish the moment they are released, leaving him only low-fare short-distance leftovers. In driver chat groups, he learned that some peers privately sold a cheating program capable of automatically filtering high-paying orders and snatching them within milliseconds, usable after purchasing paid activation keys.
Massive abnormal operation records also caught the attention of public security authorities. During routine online patrols, the Cyber Security Detachment of Wujin Branch, Changzhou Public Security Bureau, Jiangsu Province, detected relevant clues via backend technical monitoring and officially filed a case for investigation in May 2024.
Relying on technical means including electronic data tracing and capital flow tracking, investigators followed the trail to fully uncover the cross-provincial criminal network. Investigations revealed clear, tightly coordinated division of labor among upstream and downstream gang members: an upstream programmer independently coded the cheating program; mid-stream multi-tier agents resold activation keys at marked-up prices; two downstream ride-hailing drivers built offline studios to provide paid proxy order-grabbing services, forming a complete illegal industrial chain covering R&D, supply, multi-level distribution and paid proxy grabbing. Between June and November 2024, police apprehended all seven core suspects, seizing a large quantity of digital evidence and illicit assets including involved computers, multiple mobile phones, USB drives storing source codes, and illegal proceeds.
The "Order-Grabbing Magic Tool" Operates Without Platform Authorization
Guo, a bachelor’s graduate majoring in computer science, possessed independent programming capabilities. In April 2024, Li Jia contacted him via ride-hailing chat groups with a request to customize an order-grabbing cheating program for a mainstream ride-hailing platform. Leveraging his technical expertise, Guo cracked the platform’s login verification parameters and developed the automated order-grabbing program.
Forensic appraisal confirmed the program’s strong intrusive capacity: it bypasses platform login verification, retrieves the full real-time order list without permission, precisely screens premium orders according to preset thresholds for fare, mileage and distance, and automatically submits order acceptance requests—all without any official authorization from the ride-hailing platform.
To sustain illegal profit-making, Guo designed an activation key licensing mechanism, selling the cheating program bundled with activation keys priced by usage cycles. Weekly and monthly keys cost several hundred to several thousand yuan; monthly licenses supported simultaneous logins of up to 100 driver accounts for batch order grabbing. After arrest, Guo confessed that he knew unauthorized scraping of platform data constituted an offense yet took chances, falsely believing that the platform would still earn revenue as drivers completed cheated orders and would not hold him accountable.
Ride-Hailing Drivers Expand a New Illegal Business
Li Jia acted as the general agent of the cheating program, holding exclusive supply. He sold activation keys retail while recruiting multiple subordinate agents to expand sales channels. From April to June 2024, his total sales turnover of activation keys exceeded 360,000 yuan. After deducting over 200,000 yuan paid to Guo as cost, he made a net illegal profit of more than 150,000 yuan.
To broaden distribution, Li Jia recruited Wang Jia as his core second-tier agent, plus two regional distributors Li Yi and Ma. Li Jia purchased bulk program licenses and activation keys from Guo, then jointly distributed them with Wang Jia to Li Yi and Ma, who resold the keys to individual drivers. Investigations showed sales covered provinces nationwide, with thousands of activation keys activated in total. Mass adoption of the cheating program severely squeezed order opportunities for law-abiding drivers and disrupted the platform’s normal operation and dispatching order.
Unlike the five suspects engaged in program R&D and distribution, Wang Yi and Liu, both professional ride-hailing drivers, initially bought the cheating program solely for their own order grabbing. After long-term use, burdened by recurring activation key costs, they conceived the idea of operating a paid proxy order-grabbing service to share expenses and earn extra illicit income.
In April 2024, the two agreed to jointly set up an offline proxy studio in a rental apartment in Wujin District, Changzhou. They invested 16,000 yuan to purchase bulk program licenses and activation keys from general agent Li Jia, posting advertisements in nationwide ride-hailing driver social media groups to attract clients with order-grabbing demands. Clients only needed to provide account login verification codes; the pair would use the cheating program to auto-accept rides matching clients’ preset criteria, charging tiered proxy service fees by daily, weekly or monthly subscription packages.
Distinct Criminal Charges Based on Conduct
On July 2, 2025, public security organs transferred the seven suspects to the Wujin District People’s Procuratorate of Changzhou for examination and prosecution on suspicion of crimes endangering computer information system security. Prosecutors fully reviewed case files, cross-referencing suspect statements, electronic data, platform certification materials, capital transaction records and forensic appraisal reports. They distinguished clear differences in criminal means and infringed legal interests between two groups of suspects: Guo, Li Jia, Li Yi, Wang Jia and Ma profited by developing and distributing intrusive cheating programs; Wang Yi and Liu only purchased the program to intrude the platform system, illegally extract order data and charge proxy fees.
Prosecutors held that the order-grabbing program, capable of bypassing platform security verification and illegally acquiring account credentials and order data, qualifies as an intrusive computer information system program as defined under the Criminal Law. The five suspects including Guo, who developed and distributed such programs, shall be prosecuted for the crime of providing programs for intruding into computer information systems. Wang Yi and Liu, who did not participate in program development or sales but only purchased the cheating tool to illegally extract order data for profit, shall be held liable for the crime of illegally obtaining computer information system data.
On June 5 this year, the Wujin District People’s Procuratorate filed public prosecution: charging Guo and four co-defendants with the crime of providing programs for intruding into computer information systems, and Wang Yi and Liu with the crime of illegally obtaining computer information system data. On June 30, the court fully adopted the prosecution’s opinions, sentencing all seven defendants to three years’ fixed-term imprisonment with probation, coupled with fines ranging from 20,000 to 60,000 yuan. The judgment has now taken legal effect. For individual drivers caught using the cheating program to grab orders frequently, ride-hailing platforms will permanently block their driver accounts upon detection.
(Outlook New Era)